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a lake and includes a portion of the lakebed. The first approach, the
common law rule, states that the owner of a portion of the lakebed
only has the right to the exclusive use and control of the waters located
above that property. Illinois, however, follows the second approach,
the civil rule, which states the owner of a portion of a lakebed is entitled to the reasonable use of the entire surface of the lake.
Next, the court determined that the water-filled quarry was a manmade lake. Therefore, the court stated the issue was whether riparian
rights extend to a man-made lake. Generally, riparian rights do not
extend to owners of property abutting an artificial lake because it
would be inequitable to give property owners rights to a body of water
that someone else created, merely because their property touches the
water. However, the court explained an exception to the general rule,
recognized as the "artificial-becomes-natural rule," may apply in certain
situations. Courts may recognize an artificial body of water as a natural
watercourse if: (1) the body of water is of a permanent character; (2)
the circumstances under which the original party created the body of
water indicate the intent to make the body permanent; and (3) people
have consistently used the body of water with such an intention for a
significant period of time. The court also noted that other courts have
only applied the artificial-becomes-natural rule when the party seeking
to invoke the rule has used the artificial body of water without dispute
for a significant period of time.
The court concluded that the artificial-becomes-natural rule did
not apply to the case at bar because the Aldersons had not used the
man-made lake for a long period of time, and the Aldersons' use of the
man-made lake had been a matter of dispute since their purchase of
the McElvain property. Further, the court stated the Aldersons could
not argue that they had used the man-made lake as a permanent body
of water for a significant period of time by tacking on the years during
which the McElvains owned the property, because there is no evidence
the McElvains used the man-made lake. While the Aldersons argued
their ownership of the lakebed was sufficient to entitle them to use the
entire lake, the court disagreed stating the adoption of such a ruling
would lead to inequitable results. Lastly, the court noted that the AIdersons did not have rights to the man-made lake as a result of a grant,
easement by prescription, or easement by implication. Thus, the court
affirmed the judgment of the appellate court in favor of Fatlan and the
other homeowners.
Kimberly Folk
KANSAS
Frank v. Kan. Dep't. of Agric., 198 P.3d 195 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming the district court holding that the Kansas Division of Water
Resources acted within its authority and was entitled to deference,
where the chief engineer's interpretation of an ambiguous Kansas stat-
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ute provided a rebuttable presumption that a stream existed in a watershed area even where a well-defined bed and banks were no longer
visible, resulting in a finding that a landowner unlawfully obstructed a
stream while constructing a groundwater pit on his land).
Acting on a permit obtained from the chief engineer of the Kansas
Division of Water Resources ("Division"), plaintiff, T.W. Frank
("Frank") built a groundwater pit on his land in rural Sumner County,
Kansas. As a condition of the permit, Frank built an embankment to
prevent surface water from entering the pit. However, after the completion of the pit and embankment, and upon complaints from
neighboring landowners that Frank's embankment caused a water
back-up and flooding, the Division concluded that Frank had obstructed a stream, exceeding the authorization of his permit and in
violation of Kansas law. The Division required that Frank obtain an
additional permit authorizing a stream obstruction to continue with
the project. Frank challenged the Division's interpretation of the statute as unreasonable and beyond the scope of the law. After the District
Court of Sumner County affirmed the Division's findings, holding that
the Division was entitled to administrative deference, Frank appealed
to the Court of Appeals of Kansas.
By statute, Kansas law prohibits stream obstructions absent a permit
from the Division, but the statute gives no guidance as to what constitutes a stream. To clarify the statute, the Division promulgated a regulation defining a stream as any waterway with well-defined banks, even
when water does not flow continuously. In addition, the regulation
provided for a presumption that in certain watershed areas, a stream
could have existed in any location unless a landowner conclusively
demonstrates that a well-defined bed and banks did not exist before
beginning a proposed project. Frank's property fell within the scope of
this regulation; it lay within a watershed area, but had changed over
time such that a determination that a stream with a well-defined bed
and banks once existed was no longer possible on visual inspection.
Frank's primary argument was that the Division's interpretation of the
statute and resulting regulation was unreasonable, and that the statute
intended to require that a stream with defined bed and banks must
exist immediately before creating an obstruction.
The court held that where factual disputes are determined by applying an agency's expertise, and where an agency is responsible for
administering a statute that requires expert administration, that agency
is entitled to deference. Further, the court held that when an agency's
statutory interpretation is entitled to deference, the court will uphold
its interpretation if there is a rational basis for it, even where other interpretations are also possible. The court found that the Division's
interpretation and regulation was rational because the Division's definition of a stream as a well-defined watercourse essentially tracked preexisting Kansas case law, and because the position that a well-defined
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stream need not be discernible to presume one existed was consistent
with the legislative purpose to give the Division jurisdiction over stream
obstructions. The court explained that Frank's proposed interpretation, that a stream must be in existence immediately before an obstruction is built, would allow a person to avoid the statute's reach and nullify the Divisions authority by modifying a stream's bed and banks prior
to building the obstruction.
Finally, upon granting the Division deference as to the presumption that a stream could exist anywhere in a watershed, the court found
that Frank failed to meet his burden of establishing that a stream did
not exist. In fact, the court found that the Division provided ample
evidence, based on physical and hydrological analysis of Frank's property, that a well-defined stream or channel likely did exist at some
point. For the foregoing reasons, the court affirmed the district court
ruling, holding that the Kansas Division of Water Resources correctly
determined that Frank had to obtain a permit under the Kansas stream
obstruction law.
Jeff McGaughran
Frick Farm Prop., L.P. v. Kan. Dep't of Agric., 190 P.3d 983 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that the Department of Agriculture, Division of
Water Resources ("DWR"), can terminate a private owner's water rights
if, after DWR presents a verified report of nonuse, the owner fails to
meet its burden of showing either (1) lawful and beneficial use of the
water within 5 years, or (2) due and sufficient cause for nonuse).
In November 2002, Frick Farm Properties ("Frick Farm") purchased a water right from Bernard Debes ("Debes") who had previously owned the water right since 1982. In January 2003, Frick Farm
received notice that no one had used the water right in 3 years. In
January 2004, Frick Farm received another letter from Division of Water Resources ("DWR") stating that no one had used Frick Farm's water
right in 3 years and that DWR would terminate the water right if the
period of nonuse continued for 5 years. In response, Frick Farm sent
DWR a letter stating that Debes had been unable to use the water right
because of his poor health and that Frick Farm had only possessed the
right since October 2002. In August 2004, Frick Farm received a letter
and a draft verified report from DWR advising Frick Farm that DWR
would use the draft verified report as prima facie evidence to terminate
Frick Farm's water right. However, the letter gave Frick Farm another
opportunity to report a reason for the nonuse of its water right. In
October 2004, DWR sent a verified report to Frick Farm stating that
DWR had found no valid cause excusing the nonuse from 1985 to
2003. At a subsequent hearing, DWR concluded that Frick Farm had
abandoned and forfeited the water right by failing to establish due and
sufficient cause for the nonuse.

